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The federal Administrative Procedure Acte has been on the
statute books for a quarter of a century. However, only now are the
compromises agreed upon in order to soften the rigors of adjudicatory
procedures being fully exploited by the Federal Power Commission
and upheld by the courts. The FPC now deems itself authorized
to forsake its long-established pattern of "full evidentiary hearings"
in ratemaking cases for a new streamlined procedure based on the
compromise procedure of the APA, which exempts ratemaking
from adjudication and includes it in rulemaking.2 In the course
of using the "ratemaking as rulemaking"' provision, however, the
FPC has taken undue advantage of the fact that interpretive rulemaking, an integral part of formulating a rate model, is exempted from
the formal publication requirements of rulemaking.3 Since interpretive rulemaking is normally carried on in an adjudicative proceeding and the rules published in an opinion, interpretive rules
were plausibly exempted from such requirements by the draftsmen
of the APA. However, in present FPC practice, where there is no
adjudicative proceeding but only a rulemaking proceeding, merely
the rate order and other orders associated therewith are promulgated as formal rules. The interpretive rules which go into the formulation and application of a rate model are not proposed or pub* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. B.S. 1932, J.D. 1935, State
University of Iowa; LL.M. 1963, Tulane University.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1970).
2. See Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5(c), 8(a), 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d),
557(b) (1970).
3. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2) (1970). Notice and participation in interpretive rulemaking would not seem exempted since
just and reasonable rates, pursuant to section 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717d (1970), may be determined only after a hearing, and such rulemaking
would be an integral part of the determination.
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lished as formal rules and are subject to only indirect attack in the
4
rulemaking proceeding.
There was apparently no intention in Congress to deal with interpretive rulemaking in the compromises which transferred ratemaking from adjudication to rulemaking-in fact, however, the compromises served to relegate this process to marginal protection by the
APA in the formulation of such rules, and to protection by only constitutional due process requirements in the rules' application. This
result stemmed from the fact that all ratemaking, presumably interpretive formulation of the specifics of the just and reasonable rate
model as well as the formal promulgation of the rate itself, was removed from adjudication, where it was subject to the protective processes of full evidentiary hearings, and was consigned to the more
limited protection afforded the rulemaking process.5 Since this shift
was an afterthought, made at the behest of those agencies concerned
with the overjudicialization of such processes as ratemaking,O initial
licensing and corporate reorganization, all of the results of the shift
on the structure of the statute may not have received adequate consideration by Congress.
As the majority bill for the APA was originally drafted, "rule"
was defined to include "the whole or any part of any agency statement of general applicability designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy. . ..
This statement clearly included formally promulgated legislative rules prepared pursuant to a power to
make substantive rules and regulations to implement a statute as well
as interpretive rules announced by an agency incident to applying a
broadly drafted statute to a specific case; the latter would be the
"new rules [which] sometimes come into being . . . through the
process of administrative adjudication."8 However, this interpretive
or "ad hoc"'9 decisional rulemaking process was specifically exempted
"7

4. Appalachian and Illinois Basin Area Proceeding, 86 P.U.R.3d 16 (FPC
1970). See notes 121-28 infra and accompanying text.
5. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
6. For example, see the testimony of Commissioner Aitchison of the Interstate Commerce Commission, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-07 (1946).
7. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 6, at 156.
8. NLRB v. E. & B. Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1960). The
court also said: "Just as courts generally do not hesitate to announce new rules to
govern novel or changed conditions, so administrative boards often lay down new
so-called 'interpretive' rules." Id.
9. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947), Justice Murphy used
the phrase "ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct." The
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from the notice and publication requirements of the formal rulemaking process, presumably on the theory that the process resulting
in interpretive rules would be adequately safeguarded by the procedures laid down for adjudication, where, by definition, interpretive
rulemaking would be expected to take place.
But in the legislative compromises exempting "proceedings involving the validity or application of rates. . ." from the judicialization or separation of functions requirements of APA § 5(c)' 0 and
including them in the definition of "rule,"" the entire ratemaking
process was ostensibly transferred, including the interpretive rulemaking essential to the process, as well as the formal promulgation
of rate orders. However, the exemption of interpretive rules from
formal publication was not disturbed despite the fact that the draft
bill from which the "ratemaking as rulemaking' idea was lifted also
included a provision that interpretive rules were to be issued as
rules.12
Prior to the legislature's forsaking the pattern of "full evidentiary hearings" in ratemaking cases, the exemption of interpretive
rulemaking from formal publication was not of great moment since
the interpretive rulemaking process had gone on in the full light of an
adversary adjudication, with ample opportunity for competing experts to make their interpretive proposals on the record, to be subjected to cross-examination thereon, and, if a proposal were not
adopted, to attack the opposing interpretive proposal by taking exception thereto on brief before the examiner and on review by the
full agency. It was, no doubt, the general acceptance of these adjudicative procedures for the formulation of interpretive rules which
prompted the draftsmen of the majority bill to exempt interpretive
rules and statements of policy from the formal notice and publication
term "informal rulemaking" is also encountered. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 772 (1969); Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative
Procedure, 26 _Aw & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 228 (1961). See also Peck, The
Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE
L.. 729, 756 (1961) ("ad hoc policy-making process"). While not in common use,
the term "ad hoc rulemaking" seems appropriate and acceptable shorthand to describe the process, along with "policy-making" and "informal rulemaking," where,
as in the FPC, a welter of accounting and financial rules are being formulated in
this way.
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d) (1970).
11. See Administrative Procedure Act §§ 2(c), 8(a), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4),
557(b) (1970).
12. S.Doc. No. 248, supra note 6, at 166.
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The legislators assumed that such rules

would be announced in opinions accompanying adjudicative orders
and would have been preceded by hearings fully participated in by
the original and intervening parties after notice by pleadings as to
the issues of law which would be involved in the application of a
broadly drawn statute. Thus, in an initial draft of the majority bill,
which contemplated that the process would go on in the restricted
context of adjudication, interpretive or ad hoe rulemaking could
safely be exempted from the protections afforded formal rulemaking. 14 The procedure was left in limbo, however, when ratemaking
was transferred from adjudication to formal rulemaking, but, at the
same time, interpretive rulemaking, an integral part of ratemaking,
was exempted from notice and hearing requirements of formal rulemaking except where required by substantive statute, and was exempted entirely from publication requirements.
As noted, during the formulation of the APA, exemptions from
the adjudicatory process were sought for ratemaking, initial licensing,
and corporate reorganization, primarily due to concern that these
agency responsibilities be freed from the restraints of a rigorous separation of functions so as to maximize the use of agency expertise in
the formulation of complex and sophisticated criteria for the determination of controversies and so as to avoid leaving such matters
wholly in 1the
hands of a single trial examiner even in initial determinations. 5 Relatively little attention was paid to the fact that freeing these agency responsibilities from adjudicatory restraints would
place substantial power in the agencies over the degree of participation to be accorded interested parties in the hearing process. This aspect of the exemptions was to assume importance only at a later date.
A comment by the Solicitor for the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in an early symposium on the APA, well Mustrates that the drafters' focus of concern was elsewhere than on the
possible submergence of the interpretive ad hoc rulemaking process
which would result from the transfer of ratemaking, initial licensing,
and corporate reorganization from the full adjudicatory procedures
to formal rulemaking. The Solicitor, whose primary concern was
safeguarding adequate participation in the proceedings by agency ex13. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
14. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 6, at 157.
15. See 92 CONG. REc. 5651 (1946) (remarks of Representative Walter).
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perts, saw the party interests adequately safeguarded by rules of practice which would "postpone until some difference of opinion may
arise any determination of whether in the absence of agreement
either the letter or spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act may require the following of a particular procedural routine in connection
with any particular statutory procedure."'1 6 The Solicitor noted that
the current rules of practice of the SEC made it the duty of the parties to specify as early as possible in the proceeding what procedures
they deemed "necessary or appropriate" and made it the "duty of the
examiner to see that a clear understanding is reached at an early date
as to the procedure which the parties may desire."'17 He observed
that, typically, counsel before that Commission evidenced less concern for obtaining procedural due process (presumably provided by
the adjudicatory requirements of the APA) and more concern for
avoiding an undue amount of procedure which might slow up obtaining a decision of the Commission.' 8 He could not have foreseen
the development now at hand in which public interest bodies may be
deprived of a forum in which to voice questions concerning interpretive ad hoe rules adopted by the FPC except upon the decision by
that body that the issues require public illumination.
What "ratemaking as rulemaking" currently means to the FPC
is evidenced by a statement made by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in sustaining the power of the FPC to promulgate a formal rule that pipeline companies price gas produced by them at
area prices:
ifihe Commission may conduct, as it did here, a full evidentiary
hearing of the type contemplated by Sections 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act, or may use any variant of such procedures. Whatever procedure is utilized, a primary objective is the
acquisition of information which will enable the Commission to
carry out effectively the provisions of the Natural Gas Act. The
ability to choose with relative freedom the procedure it will use to
acquire relevant information gives the Commission power to realisticaUy tailor the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the information it needs to illuminate those issues and the manner of pres16. Foster, Application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Statutes
Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in THE FBDERAL ADmnISTrATIVE PROCEDURE Acr AD Tm ADMINIsTAnVE AGENCIES 213, 221 (G. Warren, ed. 1947).
17. Id. at 221-22.
18. Id. at 222-23.
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entation which, in its judgment, will bring before it the relevant information in the most efficient manner. 19
The rule in question was formally promulgated as a part of the
FPC General Rules as follows:
As a matter of policy in future pipeline rate proceedings, gas produced by pipelines or by their affiliates from leases acquired after
the date of this order will be priced for rate making purposes at the
just and reasonable area rate applicable to gas of a vintage corresponding to the date of completion of the first well on the lease, otherwise at the "in-line" price, or, if there is no in-line price, on the basis
of the guideline price .... 20
The congerie of interpretive rules which underlay the "just and reasonable area rate" referred to in the rule now need not be tested in an
adversary setting and published unless the FPC finds it expedient or
is ordered to do so. The concern of this article is with this shift in
procedure, from formulating and applying subsidiary ratemaking
criteria as interpretive rulemaking in an adversary adjudicative setting, to carrying it on in the semi-private, less adversary context of
formal rulemaking which the FPC has now espoused. The following pages note the initial Supreme Court participation in the formulation of interpretive ad hoe rules for determining just and reasonable rates for natural gas pipeline companies in the transition from the
fair value approach.2 The development then proceeds to the ratemaking problems precipitated by the extension of FPC jurisdiction
to independent producers of natural gas and to the early ad hoe attempts to determine just and reasonable costs and prices for gas produced and distributed, or produced and sold, to independent pipelines. Throughout the discussion, the procedural format in which
all of this decision making took place and the complexity of the resulting ad hoc rules are of primary concern. The development notes
the utilization of the certification proceeding as the public forum in
which interpretive ad hoc rules had first to be formulated in order to
control price pending definitive determination on an area basis.
From such proceedings emerged the preliminary interpretive rule
that a price which was "in line" with prices generally in effect for gas
19. City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added).

20. 18 C.F.R. § 2.66(a) (1970).
21. For an analysis of this transition, see Dakin, The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation: Just Compensation, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 36
TuLANE L. REv. 711 (1962).
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produced in a field or area would be the tentative reasonable price
for the purpose of certifying sales or transportation of gas pending
definitive determination of the "just and reasonable" price for an
area.
The exceedingly complex interpretive ad hoc rulemaking and
application which was to follow in fixing definitive area rates took
place in full public adjudicatory proceedings with maximum participation by all interested parties before a trial examiner charged with
the responsibility for recommending a decision. The remainder of
the article is devoted to assaying the results of that enterprise at the
commission and court levels and to describing the transition now
underway from such full public adjudicatory proceedings to an
abridged, formal, semi-private rulemaking process deemed permissible under the APA. The thesis developed is that the newly
adopted approach unduly submerges the crucially important formulation and application of interpretive ad hoc rules in a manner literally permissible under the APA, but unintended and inadvertently
brought about by compromises in the legislative drafting.
THE INTERPRETIVE RULES OF

Hope AND Phillips

When the FPC decided Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,22
ratemaking "methodology" had already been largely supplied by the
Supreme Court through the concurring opinions in FPC v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co.;23 the Commission was free to apply the Brandeis
formula of fixing a return which would cover the use of capital, allowance for risk incurred and enough more to attract capital, whatever the nature of the security issued therefor. Thus in Hope, the
FPC needed only to apply these interpretive rules of the Supreme
Court and to find and fix the rate of return at 6/p% after
taking into account from an adversary record an "abundance of
evidence" including
investors' appraisal of the natural gas industry, comparative risk data,
interest rates and yields on securities of natural gas and electric utilities, statistics showing the growth and stability of the natural gas
industry, the trend of the cost of money and its current cost, . . .
the financial history of the Hope Company and the facts about re24
cent financing by its parent Standard Oil Company.
22. 3 F.P.C. 150 (1942), rev'd sub nor. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 134

F.2d 287 (1943), rev'd, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (FPC order held valid).
23. 315 U.S. 575, 602-03 (1942).

24. 3 F.P.C. at 185-86.
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When the Supreme Court appraised the FPC's order, it refined the
"methodology" somewhat and restated it in terms of price: rates
were "just and reasonable" and therefore in compliance with due
process if they enabled the company to (1) operate successfully; (2)
maintain financial integrity; (3) attract capital; and (4) compensate
investors for the risks assumed. 25
Formal accounting requirements already in existence for pipeline companies provided a large part of the data required for the
new test model. Data on plant, depreciation, and working capital
were already required to be submitted under existing rules, as were
financial data on capital structures of utilities.20 Other interpretive
rules would be formulated ad hoe for the measurement of such esoteric phenomena as debt-equity ratios and earnings-price ratios, all
essential to applying the new Supreme Court guideline rules. Tariff
increases would be rejected if existing price tariffs were found to
yield revenues for the test period which, when translated into a composite rate of return (constructed from pro rata returns on debt and
equity) satisfied, in the agency's view, these Supreme Court criteria.
Presumably, such tariffs would contain a minimum of monopoly
profit and would permit the utility to "operate successfully" and to
"attract capital" because they adequately compensated investors for
risks assumed. The revenue statement and the market were to be
the source of data for the determination of the rate of return, after
scrutiny for inaccuracies and excesses which might redound to the
benefit of the venture stock.
A decade after Hope, in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,27
the Supreme Court ruled that gas producing companies were natural
gas companies along with pipeline and distributor companies. The
effect was to expand the price-fixing authority of the FPC from
jurisdiction over less than 200 pipeline companies to several thousand independent producers of natural gas. Overwhelmed by the
magnitude of the problems precipitated by the decision, the Commission fell back upon competition as the determinant of price, at
least where production was combined with the transportation of gas
by a pipeline company. Thus, in an adjudication of the reasonable25.
26.
pt. 201
27.

320 U.S. at 605 (1944).
These requirements are presently contained in various sections of 18 C.F.R.
(1972).
347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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ness of rates charged by Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, 28
the FPC substantially modified its Hope rate base approach for the
company's producing properties by adopting a "field" price rule for
gas obtained from these properties based upon the "weighted average
arms-length prices" established by federally unregulated bargaining
for similar gas in the field. However,
upon judicial review, the or29
der was set aside and remanded.
Defeated by the courts in its attempt to use "field prices" as a
determinant for the price of gas to the pipelines, the FPC turned to
new experimental ad hoe procedures which would enable it to test
the reasonableness of the price of gas by more or less conventional
rate base approaches. Thus the examiner's approach in the Phillips Petroleum Co. case,30 concluded six years after the momentous
jurisdictional decision, was to utilize ad hoe procedures which
brought together in one lump sum the cost of producing gas,
the cost of purchasing gas, and the cost of gathering the gas.
To this figure was added a return on a rate base consisting of production and gathering facilities and working capital. Finally, to this
amount was added the alleged actual -liability for federal income
taxes, producing a total adjusted cost of service translated into a cost
of natural gas of 11.3747 cents per thousand cubic feet.
At the time the FPC was reviewing the examiner's decision in
Phillips, it had already made its decision to move to a new method
of fixing natural gas rates by areas, using group costs either on a
national or area rate basis in lieu of fixing the cost of gas by companies on an individual rate base method. However, it was necessary to dispose of the Phillips proceeding which had been pending
since 1954; the Commission determined that the sytem-wide cost of
gas for jurisdictional sales was $10,000,000 in excess of the applicable jurisdictional revenues and, on the basis of these findings,
terminated its inquiry into the reasonableness of the Phillips rates
and discharged Phillips' obligation to refund prior charges. Even
though the inquiry was not definitive, important ad hoe rulemaking
was required principally in solving allocation problems incident to
dividing production costs between oil and gas production and allocating exploration costs between oil and gas.8 '
28. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 13 F.P.C. 53 (1954).
29. City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956).
30. 24 F.P.C. 537, 590 (1960).
31. Id. at 562-63.
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INTERIM INTERPRETIVE RULES-THE ROLE OF CERTIFICATION

The FPC's formulation of rules of ratemaking for multiple companies on an area basis, as distinguished from the one company
rate base model, and the application of those rules was to be a long
and laborious process. For the interim, the authority of the FPC
to control sales and transportation of gas through the certification
process was to be used to assure protection to the consumer against
monopoly profit. In an initial attempt to make reasonable price a
term or condition of a certificate, the FPC vacillated, then finally
backed down; 2 Supreme Court action was required to establish that
"reasonable price" was an appropriate term or condition of certification in addition to the other requisites which could be imposed by
the FPC. Thus, in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York 3 (the CATCO case), because no evidence of
the reasonableness of price had been introduced by the applicant for
certification, the Supreme Court directed the FPC to deny the application; in doing so, the Court articulated guidelines for the determination of a reasonable price, stating:
Where the proposed price is not in keeping with the public interest
because it is out of line or because its approval might result in
a triggering of general price rises or an increase in the applicant's
existing rates by reason of "favored nation" clauses or otherwise, the
Commission in the exercise of its discretion might attach such conditions as it believes necessary.3 4
This statement was the first ad hoc articulation of the "in-line" price
concept which was deemed necessary for fulfillment of the Congres''31
sional "comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme.
As a preparatory step prior to the issuance of notice of ratemaking by areas, the FPC used this new-found authority to issue a Statement of General Policy in which, with later amendments, it announced "in-line" prices as the area price levels for natural gas sales
by independent producers during the period prior to the establishment of an area reasonable price.3 6 In the absence of telling evidence warranting other action by the Commission, proposed initial
sales of natural gas by independent producers which included rates
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 563, 732, 880 (1957).
360 U.S. 378 (1959).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
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higher than those indicated were to be denied a certificate or certified
only upon the condition that lower rates be filed. The Statement
was said by the FPC to be based on "our experience gained after
six years of regulation of independent producers under the Natural
Gas Act."3' 7 It was published in the Federal Register pursuant to
APA § 31 8 but was not preceded by formal rulemaking hearings,
presumably on the theory that neither APA § 439 nor the Natural
Gas Act (NGA) § 1640 required them.
The FPC's rule as to "in line" prices was upheld in United Gas
Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc.,4 1 where the Supreme
Court concluded that under NGA § 7(e)42 adequate protection to
the public interest required "as an interim measure that gas not enter the interstate market at prices higher than existing levels." 43 The
FPC was not required to canvass any evidence bearing on the question of what would be a just and reasonable price for the gas sought
to be certified but could reject the application on the basis of the announced rule. The FPC was said to be well within the thrust of the
court's CATCO opinion directing the Commission to use its § 7 conditioning power to prevent large jumps in initial contract prices,
pending the determination of just and reasonable rates.4 4
THE PERMIAN BASIN AREA RATE PROCEEDINGS-INTERPRETIVE
RULES IN AN ADJUDICATiVE SETTING

The new adventure in area ratemaking started quite unpretentiously with a notice and order for institution of a proceeding in
which the FPC proposed to determine the just and reasonable rate or
rates for the sale of natural gas produced in the Permian Basin
area. 4 5 All pertinent pending producer rate-suspension proceedings
under § 4 and all pertinent applications for certification under
§ 7 of the NGA were consolidated with the § 5 proceedings to determine just and reasonable rates for the area.4" The order delineated boundaries for the area and announced that no contentions
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
Id. § 553.
15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970).
382 U.S. 223 (1965).
15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1970).
382 U.S. at 227.
360 U.S. at 391.
Area Rate Proceeding, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
See 15 U.S.C. H§ 717c, 717f, 717d (1970).
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would be entertained as to inappropriateness of the area for ratemaking purposes nor would any evidence be considered looking toward
the fixing of rates for sale of gas outside the boundaries of the area.
The appointment of an examiner to preside at the hearings was
made in compliance with APA § 7 and § 11, 47 indicating the
FPC's intent to conduct a full "adjudicatory" hearing. A pre-hearing conference was held in order to simplify and delineate the issues
and to determine the type of evidence to be adduced, order of presentation, and number of witnesses to be heard on any issue or subject. Persons seeking an opportunity to participate in the hearings
were required to file a statement setting out their interests in the
proceedings. Four years later the examiner's opinion was published
and a year thereafter the final decision and order of the FPC was
48
issued.
In Phillips, the FPC had declared that its objective was "to set
prices in all producing areas . . . adequate to maintain the gas supplies needed by the consumers of the nation, but at prices that are
no higher than are necessary to accomplish that purpose. ' 4 The
Commission had indicated that it would make use of cost data obtained in the past and that it would acquire and consider cost information in the future. Costs relative to a representative sampling of
the industry in any one area were to be accepted as part of the basis
for fixing rates for all producers in the areas.
The FPC's experience in the Phillips case and others during the
six year period of producer regulation had impressed upon it the difficulties which would be encountered in fixing rates for producers
on an area basis. The Commission noted particularly the difficulty
of formulating rules for the allocation of expenses between production of oil and gas and the difficulty of estimating reserves for gas
when qualified experts differed as much as one hundred percent in
appraising the quantity of reserves in the same formations. It cautioned that "[wihen an unrealistic result is reached, the formulae
for allocations must be changed, in order to bring about a reasonable
result. [Otherwise] [tlhe allocation methods . . . become a means
of supporting a result already arrived at, rather than a means of arriving at a result which was previously unknown."o In approach47.
48.
49.
50.

5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 3105 (1970).
Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159, 306 (1965).
24 F.P.C. at 547.
Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
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ing its new regulatory task the FPC quoted Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in ColoradoInterstateGas Co. v. FPC1 that
[flarsighted gas-rate regulation will concern itself with the present
and future, rather than with the past, as the rate base formula does.

It will take account of conditions and trends at the source of the
supply being regulated. It will use price as a tool to bring goods to

market-to obtain for the public service the needed amount of
gas.

52

It expressed confidence that, within the area regulatory pattern,
it could fix prices which would provide the incentive producers
needed to explore to meet the nation's increasing demand for natural gas and yet would give consumers the protection which the
53

NGA intended.

INTERPRETIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERMIAN MODEL AND

METHODOLOGY-EVOLVING ACCOUNTING
RULES IN ADJUDICATION

As previously noted, the primary concern of this article is with
the FPC's transition from the employment of the full adjudicatory
procedure, at one time deemed to be dictated by NGA § 5, to the
procedures authorized by the APA in classifying ratemaking and initial licensing as rulemaking. In particular, the focus of the examination is upon the formulation of rules pursuant to the ad hoe proce.
dures traditionally utilized by the FPC in adjudication and an exposition of the shortcomings of the newly-espoused formal rulemaking procedures. For such an inquiry it is not essential to examine
the entire ratemaking process; instead, it is sufficient to note the
complexities and choices made in the formulation of area methodology under ad hoe rulemaking in adjudication and to point out the
submergence of those complexities and choices when they are made
in the context of the formal rulemaking process.
The FPC acknowledged the crucial role of ad hoc formulations
of methodology in a tribute to the presiding examiner and to the
parties and intervenors in the Permianproceeding:
We acknowledge at the outset our indebtedness to Examiner
Wenner for his penetrating analysis of the basic economics of the
industry and his constructive proposals for a pricing system in har51. 324 U.S. 581, 608 (1945).

52. Id. at 612.
53. Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159, 179 (1965).
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mony with the realities of the industry and the Commission's responsibilities under the Natural Gas Act. We must acknowledge
also the helpful and constructive role of the parties to the proceeding. The cooperation of the respondents and the interveners with
the Commission has been instrumental in achieving what the examiner has described as a breakthrough in reaching a workable
method of producer regulation.54
For pipeline companies, uniform systems of accounts had already been prescribed by the FPC. However, when the Permian
proceeding was begun, producers had not yet been required to conform their books to uniform systems of accounts. Since there were
no statistics based on a uniform set of accounts, the FPC had to resort to the promulgation of a cost questionnaire in order to fill the
information gap. In addition, census data and other well-recognized and authoritative industry data were introduced through witnesses and relied upon by the FPC. But, while the questionnaire
dictated. the data to be submitted and the required detail as to national and area operations, the FPC had still to formulate on an ad
hoe basis the methodology to be applied to the data to reduce it to
costs in cents per thousand cubic feet of gas produced and ultimately to a price which would provide the needed incentive and at
the same time protect the consumer against monopoly profit.
The Permian cost model for new gas-well gas, once structured
on an ad hoc basis, also required ad hoe or interpretive rules for
selection of the data to which the cost model was to be applied in
order to yield an area rate for new gas which could be promulgated
as a formal rule by the FPC. The determination of unit costs,
begun in Phillips,emerged as the Permian cost model for new gas."
54. Id. at 172.
55.
COsT OF NEW GAs-WELL
GAS IN CENTS PER Mci

Cost Elements
Exploration and Development Costs
(1) Dry Holes
(2) Other Exploratory Costs
(3) Adjustment for Exploration in Excess
of Production
Subtotal
(4)
(4a)
(5)
(6)

Production
Adjustment
Net Liquid
Regulatory

Operating Expense
of Net to Marketed Production
Credit
Expense

Producers' Commission
Figures Determination
1.56
1.56

1.42
1.59

2.15

1.11

5.27

4.12

2.62
1.05
(3.27)
.14

2.70
(3.10)
.14
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Each of the cost elements appearing in the model required formulation of ad hoc methodology and adoption of rules for selection
of data. Analysis of the choices involved in formulating and unitizing
the major cost elements elicits apprehension when one contemplates
the present submersion of these vital procedures into a rulemaking
process which announces only the final rates, terms and conditions
as formal "rules." Apprehension is deepened as one samples the
quantitative effect of the choices on the unit cost set out above.
As the Permian model indicates, the initial determination was
the unit "dry holes cost." Producers proposed a so-called project
method which involved capitalizing total investment to acquire a
capital asset and providing for a return on that investment over its
productive life. Under this method, dry holes cost and other costs
associated with unproductive ventures would be capitalized along
with the cost of productive ventures56 and charged off as depletion,
depreciation, and amortization in usual capital recovery fashion,
probably with substantial effect on timing of the deductions. The
FPC rejected this method as a departure from industry accounting
practices and as not adequately supported in the record. In lieu
thereof, it adopted the method of determining a national dry holes
cost by multiplying the annual or test period dry hole footage by a
statistically supported dry holes drilling cost per foot; the resulting
total dry hole cost was divided by the average annual reserve additions of gas-well gas to yield a cost of 1.42 cents per Mcf of gas proDepletion, Depreciation, and Amortization
of Production Investment Costs
(7) Successful Well Costs
(8) Lease Acquisition Costs
(9) Cost of Other Production Facilities
(10) Return on Production Investment (at 12 percent)
(11)
Return on Working Capital
Subtotal
(12)
(13)

Production Taxes at 6.1 percent
Royalty at 121/ percent of Total

3.10
1.24
.31
8.45

2.88
.76
.31
5.21
.35

18.91

13.37

1.42
2.91

1.01
2.05

Total
23.24
16.43
See 34 F.P.C. at 192, 343. As will be evident, "dry holes cost" (Item 1) and
"successful well cost" (Item 7) are the basic elements. Items 8 and 9 are derived
from Item 7, and Item 2 is derived from Items 1, 7, 8 and 9. Item 3 is derived
from Items 1 and 2, and Item 10 is derived from Item 7, 8 and 9. Item 11 is
derived from Item 4, the national average for "production operating expense." See
Committee, The Permian Case, the FPC, and Economics, 77 PuB. UTi. FOitTNIGHTLY 31 (March 17, 1966).
56. Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159, 192-93 (1965).
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ducedY5 "Other exploratory costs" consisting of geophysical, lease
rentals and overhead costs, added 1.59 cents per Mcf.
The FPC believed it essential that an "allowance for losses"
be added in order to encourage a level of exploratory effort which
would provide findings of gas in excess of gas production. The
method selected to achieve this objective was to take the weighted
annual average ratio of findings of gas to production for a five-year
period, amounting to 1.37, and apply it to the dry hole and other
exploratory costs already determined. This approach permitted the
addition of 1.11 cents per Mcf as an allowance which the examiner
called "allowance for growth" and which the FPC called "adjustment for exploration in excess of production."58 The examiner,
however, based the element not on the relationship between findings
and production alone, but rather on the fact that use of this factor
would result in increasing reserves to 17.5 times annual production by 1970. Producers urged a reserve to production ratio of 20
to 1, with a commensurate increase in the "allowance for growth."5
While the FPC agreed that a strong exploration program which
would discover and develop gas reserves in ample time to meet increasing demands for gas was vital, it refused to assume the existence of a direct relationship between any calculated reserves-production ratio and the price of gas, noting that the ratio went down
steadily during the periods in which gas prices were staging their
most spectacular increases. 60 Thus the methods finally selected resulted in unit costs of exploration and development of some 4.12
cents per Mcf of production as an annual unit cost of finding necessary volumes of gas rather than the 5.27 cents per Mcf urged by
the producers.
In establishing a rate base for an area, the -PC might have proceeded by applying the method used in Phillips, aggregating the cost
of all the well equipment and reserves for all of the companies in
the area. As noted, the producers urged an approach which
would have capitalized all of the costs of acquiring capital assets in
the area, dry hole cost along with productive leases. This aggregate
for the area would then have been depreciated, depleted and amortized, and a return allowed over the years of recovery on what, for
57. Id. at 192, 383-84.

58. Id. at 193-94.
59. Id. at 386.
60. Id. at 184.
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each asset, would have been a declining rate base. The producers'
method would have resulted in a charge for successful well costs
of 3.10 cents per Mcf and an associated return on investment of
61
8.45 cents per Mcf.
The FPC chose a method more in keeping with industry practice of expensing exploration and development costs on an annual
basis. Questionnaires supplied these data on a national and area
basis. The method contemplated that the cost per foot of successful
wells would be divided by the estimated reserves added per successful foot; the result would be the "successful well cost' in cents per
Mcf as the gas was actually produced. The producers urged that, if
this method was to be used, drilling costs per foot and estimated
reserves added should at least be those supplied by the industry;
the FPC instead used census data and arrived at 2.88 cents per
62
Mcf as "successful well cost."
As indicated, in making its determination of "return on production investment," the FPC was faced with at least two ad hoc approaches. The producers' proposed method would have produced
a return of approximately 8.45 cents per Mcf of gas produced. The
alternative method was to take the successful well cost per annum
for the area and approximate an investment cost by multiplying this
annual cost by the estimated number of years for recovery of the reserves. The FPC chose the latter method on the ground that the
data was more reliable. It also chose to use census data instead of
selected group data because it was more characteristic of the industry
as a whole. The Commission selected 20 years as its model period
of recovery, with an average of 10 years plus one as the proper rate
base for computing a return (on the assumption that there was a lag
of one year between the making of an investment and recovery of
revenues thereon). Thus, its rate base calculation consisted of taking the annual total successful well and associated costs of 3.95
cents per Mcf and multiplying that sum by eleven years to obtain a
rate base of $43.45 per Mcf. 3
A rate of return was determined on the basis of procedures perfected during prior regulation of pipeline companies. Thus, the
FPC examined debt-equity ratios and concluded that the ratio for
so-called nonintegrated producers was approximately 15% debt and
61. Id. at 354-55.
62. Id. at 197-98.
63. Id. at 204.
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85% equity. The producers argued that 12% debt would have
been a more characteristic figure. The producers also argued for an
overall incentive return on the order of 16 to 18% in keeping with
non-regulated commercial rates and representing a return on common
equity, on the basis of the debt-equity ratio noted above, of approximately 20%. The FPC was persuaded by its staff that only a "fair"
rate of return was necessary and that the rate need contain no incentive factor. The Commission concluded "after weighing all the
evidence" that a return of 12% overall was appropriate. 4 Such a
rate of return applied to the rate base of $43.45 per Mcf, as determined above, resulted in a cost of 5.21 cents per Mcf. Return on
working capital figures, with regard to which alternative calculation
procedures were also proposed, increased total return to 5.56 cents
per Mcf as compared with the 8.45 cents per Mcf urged by the
producers.
In Permian, aside from preliminary statements of objectives,
the FPC did not discuss "incentive" or non-cost inclusions in the
model, treating all items as cost elements. However, it seems clear
that incentives were present in exploration and development, in the
adjustment for exploration in excess of production and in the return
on production investment to the extent return allowed exceeded experienced capital cost. There was also a negative cost element
which did not appear in the model but which reduced return by a
requirement for "absorbing" price adjustments for less than pipeline quality gas.65
SUPREME COURT APPROVAL OF PERMIAN

The Supreme Court noted, in approving the Permian order,06
that "the parties before this Court have together elected to place in
question virtually every detail of the Commission's lengthy proceedings"07 but that "a presumption of validity . . . attaches to each
exercise of the Commission's expertise, and those who would overturn the Commission's judgment undertake the 'heavy burden of
making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust
and unreasonable in its consequences.' ""
Citing the Hope case,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 200-04.
Id. at 221-25.
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
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the Court stated that its statutory review authority was circumscribed
by the NGA provision that factual findings of the FPC, if supported by substantial evidence, were to be conclusive.6 9 It thus took
a "mixed law and fact" approach and charged itself only with determining whether the "'total effect of the rate order cannot be said
,,70 The Court acknowledged
"
to be unjust and unreasonable ....
the Constitution or the Natby
required
not
is
that "the Commission
ural Gas Act to adopt as just and reasonable any particular rate
level; rather, courts are without authority to set aside any rate selected by the Commission which is within a 'zone of reasonableness.' "71 SEC v. Chenery Corp."2 was not cited although the FPC
had in an earlier case relied upon the decision to support its ad hoc
selection of methodology. 73 Rather, the Supreme Court quoted
from a pre-Chenery case that "legislative discretion implied in the
ratemaking power necessarily extends to the entire legislative process, embracing the method used in reaching the legislative determination as well as that determination itself."' 74 It saw the issues presented as (1) statutory and constitutional authority to employ area
regulation; (2) the validity of the rate structure adopted by the
FPC; (3) the accuracy of the cost and other data from which the
FPC derived its area maximum prices; and (4) the validity of the
refund obligations imposed by the FPC. 5
All of the arguments adduced by the producers to show that the
FPC had exceeded its statutory authority were rejected. Particularly, the Court rejected the argument that the FPC was limited to
regulation by individual company rate base determinations," noting
that Hope did not establish this proposition nor did dicta in the case
of Bowles v. Willingham.7 1 It thought that "the ultimate achievement of the Commission's regulatory purposes may easily depend
upon the contrivance of more expeditious administrative methods
. . . ." and that "[w]e cannot, in these circumstances, conclude that
Congress has given . . . authority inadequate to achieve with rea69. Id. at 766-67, citing 320 U.S. at 602.
70. 390 U.S. at 767, citing 320 U.S. at 602.
71. Id.
72. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
73. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 549 (1960).
74. 390 U.S. at 776, citing Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n,
289 U.S. 287, 304 (1933) (emphasis added).
75. 390 U.S. at 767-68.
76. Id. at 775.
77. Id., citing 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
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sonable effectiveness the purposes for which it has acted. '7 8 The
fact that area regulation constituted a new direction by the FPC did
not deter the Court: "[A]dministrative authorities must be permitted, consistently with the obligations of due process, to adapt their
rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances. ' 79
The Court set aside competition as a possible substitute for
regulation and approved the holding in Detroit v. FPC,80 although
without citation. 81 Summarizing the deficiencies of the market
mechanism in the Permian Basin, it noted that these imperfections,
despite an essentially monopsonistic environment, had accentuated
the consequences of inelastic supply and sharply rising demand.
The Court accepted the FPC analysis that the "inelastic supply" applied only as to the oil well gas which could not be separately sought
or independently produced because of state limitations on the production of oil. Gas-well gas, on the other hand, could be independently sought, and "[t]he supply . . . is therefore relatively elas-

tic, and its price can meaningfully be employed by the Commission
'8 2
to encourage exploration and production.
The Court approved the dual rate system, the rate for old gas
based on historic costs and the rate for new gas based on national
costs, as within the agency's authority to adopt. It noted that it
could set aside such rates only if they were not within a "zone of
reasonableness."8' 3 Buttressing the FPC's power to search for more
expeditious ratemaking methods, the Court invoked a kind of statutory equivalent of the constitutional "necessary and proper clause"
by noting that "if these arrangements are 'necessary or appropriate
to carry out provisions of this Act [NGA],'" the FPC is permitted by the statutory grant of authority to fix just and reasonable
rates."4 Most far-reaching, perhaps, was the Court's statement upholding the proscription of new rate filings, that it was ".

.

. in the

absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention,
78. 390 U.S. at 777.
79. Id. at 784.
80. 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
81. 390 U.S. at 792-95.
82. Id. at 796-97.
83. Id. at 767. See also id. at 803.
84. Id. at 797. The Court here relied upon Natural Gas Act § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717o (1970), which empowers the FPC "to prescribe . .. such . . .rules, and
regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this chapter."
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unwilling to prohibit administrative action imperative for the
achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes. '8 5
In rejecting producers' attacks on the methodology and data
selection in the Permian rate model, the Supreme Court relied upon its recent decision in Chicago & North Western Railway v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,86 a case involving an ICC
rate determination. In approving the ICC decision, the Chicago &
North Western Railway Court had noted that
presentation and discussion of evidence on cost issues constituted a
dominant part of the lengthy administrative hearings and the issues
were thoroughly explored and contested before the Commission
. [ilts conclusions had reasoned foundation and were within
...
the area of its expert judgment [with respect to] accounting probblems . . . relating entirely to . . . special and complex peculiarities .... 87
The FPC's determinations with respect to exploration and development expense were thus left relatively undisturbed by the
Court. Likewise, the relatively novel FPC method for arriving at a
rate base for the area elicited little more than a recitation, somewhat
elliptic, of what the FPC had done. The appropriateness of taking
the annual successful well cost per annum and dividing it by the
amount of reserves added to get the capital recovery cost per Mcf
produced was not questioned by the court. Translating this capital
recovery charge per Mcf into a rate base by multiplying it by the
average years of recovery was also accepted after only brief comment. The Court summarily rejected the producers' argument that
because a declining investment base would obviously result in greater
return on investment at the outset of production, diminishing during
the life of the reserve, it would have been fairer to them than such an
average base. Noting that this was "a question peculiarly within
the Commission's discretion," the Court found that the FPC's resolution could not be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable."8
85. 390 U.S. at 780.

86. 387 U.S. 326 (1967).

87. Id. at 356, quoted in 390 U.S. at 824; cf. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320

U.S. 489 (1943).

88. 390 U.S. at 805-06. In the later Southern Louisiana proceeding, 80
P.U.R.3d 197 (F.P.C. 1969), a dissenting commissioner noted that accepting the
producers' argument that 22 years rather than 20 years should be the normal period
of recovery would have made a difference of 10% in the amount of the rate base on
which return was calculated. Id. at 246-47.
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In approving the method selected for determining a rate of return, the Court was on more familiar grounds and, predictably,
probed somewhat more deeply. The FPC had determined that a
rate of return appropriately could be based in substantial part on return data for non-integrated producers. The significance of the
debt-equity ratio was noted by the Court and the selection of 12%
as a proper rate of return for gas of pipeline quality was approved.
But, as in the case of the allowance for exploration and development expense, the Court did not discuss the appropriateness of any
includbd allowance as incentive for further exploration. It concluded
simply with a citation of the Hope criteria that the rate was likely
to "maintain [the producers'] financial integrity, to attract capital,
and to compensate [their] investors for the risks assumed . .

.,.

The fact that the return of 12% was fixed for gas of pipeline quality
only and that gas of lesser quality would result in an adjustment of
the return was not deemed to invalidate it, although producers
argued that this approach treated as a risk what probably should be
treated as a cost. No abuse of discretion was found in the adoption
of this procedure. 90
The producers insisted that the effect of the FPC's methods
would be to reduce prevailing field prices and thus jeopardize essential programs of exploration. In response to their argument that the
ratio between proved recoverable reserves at current production was
dangerously declining, the Court stated that "recent variations in
the ratio of reserves to production are of quite limited significance" 91
and "[w]e assume that the Commission will continue to examine
both the premises of its regulatory methods and the consequences
for the industry's future of its rate making orders. Nothing under
the act or the cases of this Court compels the Commission to reduce its regulatory functions to self-fulfilling prophecies." 92
89. 390 U.S. at 808, quoting 320 U.S. at 605. The Commission's staff pressed
for a return of 9 % as compared with the 12% allowed by the Commission.
Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159, 345. The lower figure was rejected on the
ground that it was too closely tied to the returns of pipeline companies with higher
debt structures and 10 to 12% returns on equity. However, an allowance of 12%
over-all return for producers assumed substantially no debt; the staff figure assumed
producer debt of 15%, thus reducing the need for an over-all return of 12% to
932%. The return allowed by the Commission arguably could be said to contain
an "incentive for further exploration" to the extent debt was in fact utilized by producers.
90. 390 U.S. at 808-12.
91. Id. at 817.
92. Id. at 816 n.99.
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The examiner had adopted a method which would have required refunds only to the extent that overall industry revenues in
the area exceeded overall industry expenditures in a given year.
Guidance for application of the method was not developed further
by the examiner than a proposal that amounts to be refunded
should be "equitably apportioned among the appropriate sales under
the rates subject to refund of the category in which the excess remains. 93 The FPC felt that such a method would result in inequities among wholesale customers as well as among individual
producers, noting that "[i]f one wholesale customer has been overcharged it is of little comfort to him to know that another customer
has received a bargain." 94 As a result, the FPC rejected this proposal and adopted in lieu thereof a rule requiring refunds as to rates
in excess of area rates for all sales after the date of the Permian
order and for all sales subject to proceedings under NGA § 4(e)95
in which rates had been collected "subject to an obligation to refund
amounts collected in excess of the just and reasonable rates" to be
determined in the Permian proceeding.9 6 Upon reviewing this series of proposals, the Supreme Court upheld the FPC's authority to
order specific refunds using the area "just and reasonable rate" as a
retroactive ceiling. The Court found that the FPC had reasonably
rejected the examiner's proposal of a system of refunds conditioned
on findings as to aggregate revenues; the FPC was free to conclude
that the examiner's proposal would be7 both inequitable to consumers
and difficult to administer effectively.1
In sum, the Court maintained that in the adoption of the Permian methodology and selection of data, the FPC had given "reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors. 918 Presumably,
it had also satisfied the requisites of judicial review which the court
had stated at the outset would be fulfilled "if the Commission indicates fully and carefully the methods by which, and the purposes for
93. 34 F.P.C. at 375.
94. Id. at 232.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970).
96. 34 F.P.C. at 232.
97. 390 U.S. at 825-28. In Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 1068, 1073 (1965),
the Commission, issuing an opinion and order denying applications for rehearing of
Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965), estimated that the: quality adjustments
would range from .7 to 1.5 cents per Mcf on new gas well gas but would be affected by liquid credits. Specific allowance of the adjustment as cost would, of
course, have expanded the element of incentive in the allowed return.
98. 390 U.S. at 792.
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which, it has chosen to act, as well as its assessment of the consequences of its orders for the character and future development of
the industry."9 9 The Court did note rather wistfully, however, that
".. . we would expect that the Commission will hereafter indicate

more precisely the formulae by which it intends to proceed. .... 00
Only Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's approval of the
FPC's order, finding no compliance therein with the construction
given to the NGA by the Hope case. While he conceded that group
regulation of rates is not novel, he noted that where they had been
approved, the rates fixed on the basis of group costs were for typical
group costs of service, and the individual producer's right to minimum operating expenses and capital charges was protected.' 0 ' The
profuse use of averages implicit in the FPC's method was thought
by Justice Douglas "to take us with Alice [the Commission] into
Wonderland."'1 2
FORMAL RuLEMAKING AND INTERPRETIVE RuLEMAKING
IN THE SOUTiRN LOUISIANA PROCEEDINGS

A modest state of euphoria prevailed at the FPC when it issued
its first order in the Southern Louisiana proceedings, 08 since the order came only a few months after the Supreme Court had sustained
the Commission's Permian orders in their entirety. Producers had
again adduced the argument that regulation was not necessary because competition prevailed in the area and field prices would adequately protect the consumers. The FPC again rejected the argument on the ground that "there is a concentration of control over
the uncommitted reserves in southern Louisiana [which the producers] have made no showing to rebut."'1 4 The FPC thereupon applied its Permian two-price-system model, with historic costs for
flowing gas and national costs for new gas. Substantially the same
factor was allowed as adjustment for exploration in excess of production, using the same method adopted in Permian to arrive at this
5
figure. 0
Producers again had urged that exploration and development
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 800 Jemphasis added).
101. Id. at 831-32.
102. Id. at 836.

103. Area Rate Proceeding for Southern Louisiana, 79 P.U.R.3d 113 (FPC 1968).
104. Id. at 136.
105. Id. at 143.44.
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expenses should be capitalized and amortized and again the argument
was rejected. 10 6 They also had argued that the Permian method of
arriving at a rate base by multiplying the successful well cost (depletion, depreciation and amortization expense) per Mcf by average
years of recovery plus lag period provided inadequate incentive for
exploration and development. 0 7 Nevertheless, in establishing the
appropriate rate of return, the FPC adhered to the Permian model.
Earnings-book ratios of the integrated producers were deemed to
provide data for a return figure which could be adjusted to fit the
risks of gas production by non-integrated producers.' 08 The use of
earnings-price data from the market with adjustments to take account of the difference between stock market prices and book investments, as employed in Phillips,was rejected by the FPC in favor
of the earnings-book ratios. 0 9 Insofar as an incentive factor was included in the 12% rate of return finally approved by the FPC, it
was not discussed. The staff had urged and introduced data on
returns and debt ratios supporting only a 9/% return, but the
FPC again allowed a 12% return with no hint that the rate contained an element of incentive for exploration." 0 The FPC provided an implicitly conceded incentive for off-shore gas by fixing
the price of new gas at 20 cents per Mcf with an adjustment of 1.5
cents per Mcf for the Louisiana severance tax when the tax was in
fact 2.3 cents per Mcf."'
The institution of the Southern Louisianaproceeding as a rulemaking proceeding as well as an adjudicatory proceeding seemed in
no way to affect the FPC's treatment of its ad hoe rules as they were
developed in Permian. The rulemaking dimension was added only
to insure that the rates announced as rules would be binding not
only upon the natural gas producers in the actual proceedings "but
[on] all those who are or may become producers in the future in this
area." 1112 Utilization of rulemaking power as a device to control the
106. Id. at 138-39.
107. Id. at 149-54.
108. Id. at 155-59.
109. Id. at 156-57. The FPC conceded that the use of such ratios would be
"somewhat circular" with respect to traditional utilities but deemed the approach appropriate here. Id. at 157. For a discussion of the problems avoided here, see
Dakin, supra note 21, at 736-41.
110. 79 P.U.R.3d at 157-59.
111. Id. at 215.
112. Id. at 218.
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nature of the proceedings prior to announcement of a price as a rule
was yet to come.
The FPC had before it a settlement proposal which it rejected
on the ground that the rates and rate structure proposed would not
be consistent with the just and reasonable rates determined.1 13 It
particularly noted that the proposal did not limit initial or subsequent
rate levels specified in contracts for new gas on new acreage.'1 4
The Commission added that "[t]his is not to say that hard and fast
ceilings are to be imposed indefinitely, impervious to change despite
inflation or other unforeseeable events in the future," and announced
that the rates established "will be modified if a showing is made that
unit costs-reflecting amounts spent and reserves found-have increased to such an extent that an increase in area rates is required."' 15 It responded to the problem of special exemptions for
hardship by noting that "certain principles" have been established.
Thus "[o]verall high cost of service of an individual producer is not
a ground for relief. [But] the fact that current revenue from a particular well is less than the costs of continuing its production is a
ground for relief. [However] the fact that a producer can obtain a
higher price elsewhere is not a ground for relief." 1" 6 The Commission noted that, "[i]n determining prices, then care must be taken
that exploration and development will be sustained at an adequate
level over the long run and that available supplies are not allowed
to dwindle to a dangerous level. 111 As in Permian it rejected the
staff argument that lower prices for gas would increase exploration
and development."18
JUDICIAL CRITICISM OF THE COMMISSION'S

INTERPRETIVE RULEMAKING

Before the Southern Louisiana order had been argued on appeal, the FPC instituted new proceedings to reconsider the order.'"
When the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later affirmed the
original order, it anticipated that such hearings would result in sub113. Id. at 206.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 217-18.
116. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 209.
118. Id. at 209-10.
119. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. AR69-1, FPC, Dec. 15, 1969.
Reg. 19833 (1969).

See 34 Fed.
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stantial modification of the rates set. 120
The first concern of the court of appeals was the fact that in
spite of the Commission's optimistic conclusion regarding the adequacy of the rate selected, circumstances intervening since the Commission's decision indicated a substantial possibility that the supply
of gas was dangerously low. The court felt that a serious shortage
might already have become unavoidable because of conditions rendering any remedial action ineffective in light of the lag time between remedy and result. 12 ' It criticized the FPC for failure to consider supply in relation to demand, noting that the FPC had assumed without supportive findings that the price would be sufficiently profitable to assure an adequate supply whatever the level of
demand. The court characterized this approach as circular pricing
-that is, where demand rises and cannot be satisfied out of reservoirs that are easily enough found to allow the entrepreneur his
profit, increased demand will not be satisfied. The FPC, the court
said, should have confronted the problem in "a semi-quantitative or
qualitative way."' 2
The court of appeals was particularly critical of the ad hoc procedures used in determining "non-cost elements" in the price fixed
and the failure to explain adequately the reasons for their use. "If
the Commission approaches these matters forthrightly," the court
said, "it can expect a reviewing court to give great deference to its
expertise, even when it ventures into new territory."' 23 In discussing
the "non-cost elements," the court noted that the Supreme Court in
Permian had indicated the FPC was not bound by the sum of cost
and return even if it adopted cost as the primary basis of its calculations.' 24 While the court lamented the Commission's lack of precision in explaining such elements, it nonetheless approved the addition of 1.2 cents per Mcf for offshore gas implicit in the rounding of
18.8 cents per Mcf unit "cost" to a 20 cent ceiling and also approved the additional .8 cent per Mcf non-cost element resulting
from the treatment of the severance tax as 1.5 cents per Mcf when
its actual cost was 2.3 cents per Mcf. 12 5 The court did not allude to
120. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 950 (197.0).
121. 428 F.2d at 437.
122. Id. at 436. See also id. n.91.
123. Id. at 441.
124. Id. at 426.
125. Id. at 425.
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the computed incentive "allowance for exploration in excess of production" as a non-cost element. Nor did it discuss under this rubric
the incentive allowance presumably contained in the 12% rate of
return.
With respect to cost determinations, after examining the FPC's
rationale for selecting national cost figures over regional cost figures for pricing new gas, the court of appeals rejected the argument
that the use of national costs to fix the price of new gas was not
substantial evidence.126 Since the cost determinations constituted
rulemaking, although ad hoe in character, the court might have con27
tented itself with the rule of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.1
requiring only warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law.
The court did consider it disturbing that a dissenting commissioner
listed cost determinations involving choice of method which, had
the choices been different than they were, would have resulted in an
increase of about 4 cents per Mcf of gas. 28
The court reserved its most stinging criticism, however, for the
FPC's failure to comply with the Hope "end result' test, which required the Commission to find that "the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable ...

."129

Spe-

cifically, the court found that the FPC had refused to make findings
as to overall demand for gas and had declined to estimate future
supply in its order. Furthermore, the FPC had refused to make
findings as to the appropriate "reserves to production ratio" or
"findings to production ratio" or to assess the consequences of its
orders on these ratios. The court particularly scored the FPC's determination that the rate order would reduce revenues on the order
of $49,000,000, a finding which was supported only by the statement that "[iln our judgment, the revenues allowed . . . should

foster an active exploratory program consistent with both the financial needs of the industry and the protection of the public interest.' 30 The court quoted approvingly from the opinion of Justice
Jackson in ColoradoInterstateGas Co. V. FPCthat
if the supply is not too plentiful and the price is not a sufficient
incentive to exploit it and fails to bring forth the quantity needed,
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 432-33.
322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
428 F.2d at 433-34.
Id. at 435 n.87.

130. Id. at 437, quoting 4 Joint Appendix, pt. 1, at 683d (Commission's Opinion).

Vol. 1973:41]

RATEMAKING AS RULEMAKING

the price is unwisely low, even if it does square perfectly with some' 81
body's idea of return on a 'rate base.
The court also seemed to be urging the Commission back to
econometric studies, for it suggested the FPC should add to its Permian cost model additional ad hoc procedures which would include
three steps with respect to the industry and its performance: (1)
an estimate of the needs of consumer service (in other words, the
demand for gas); (2) a determination of the level of service which
the FPC intended to provide for, with an explanation of how that
level was related to actual demand if demand was not to be fully satisfied; (3) findings made as specific as possible with regard to how the
rate set by the FPC would affect the industry's tendency to meet
the intended level of service (in other words, an estimate of the gas
supply which the rate would bring forth). The court noted that if
the FPC set a rate on a cost basis and did not consider these issues,
its conclusionary statements that a rate was adequate or that there
would probably be no need for changes in the future would amount
132
only to "so much whistling in the dark.'
On this note the court sustained the FPC orders without modification. However, as noted, the court did so because of the existence of new proceedings which were to take into account many
of the issues whose absence had concerned the court.' 33 The court
specifically and emphatically rejected a contention of distributors
that once the FPC had established rates determined to be just and
reasonable, it had no power to set the rates aside when it later had
reason to believe its determinations might have been erroneous.
When this interpretation of the Commission's authority was questioned on petition for rehearing, the court made it "crystal-clear" that
in its view, the power was vested in the FPC to reopen any part of
its order as circumstances required. However, to obviate any further question, the court proceeded under the broad remedial powers inhering in a court of equity to make it part of the remedy in the
case that the "authority of the Commission to reopen any part of its
orders, including those affecting revenues from gas already delivered,
is left intact. The Commission can make retrospective adjustments
in this case if it finds that it is in the public interest to do so."'x
131.
132.
133.
134.

324 U.S. 581, 612 (1945).
428 F.2d at 444.
Id. at 444-45.
Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 444 F.2d 125, 126-27 (5th Cir. 1970).
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The court chose not to cite any decisional authority, contenting itself with reliance on the powers of the FPC under NGA § 16.
Predictably, Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway" 5 had been cited by distributors and consumer representatives for the proposition that any retroactive reopening and modifying of the order was precluded. 3 6 However, the Southern Louisiana court could have distinguished Arizona Grocery, since in that
case the ICC had sought in a later and entirely new proceeding to
modify a rate it had previously found to be just and reasonable for
future application. The Supreme Court had held in Arizona Grocery that the ICC could not in such a proceeding change retroactively
a rate already legislatively determined. Relying upon principles
of stare decisis, the Court had ruled that the ICC was "bound to
recognize the validity of the rule of conduct prescribed by it and not
to repeal its own enactment with retroactive effect."'' 7 In Southern
Louisiana, however, the court of appeals was reaffirming only the
FPC's authority to reopen its original order on the ground that its
first determination might have been erroneous. An agency's power
to do so, where statutorily authorized, had been upheld by the Supreme Court subsequent to the Arizona Grocery case in Baldwin v.
Scott County Milling Co.13 8 Nonetheless, in the Southern Louisiana
II proceedings, in which such an original order was being reopened,
the FPC relied wholly upon "instructions" from the court of appeals
as to its powers under NGA § 16.130
THE TRANSITION TO

RATEMAKING

AS RULEMAKING

In Permian the FPC had initiated its 1961 proceedings by issuing a notice and order for hearing under NGA § 5141 that it proposed to fix just and reasonable rates.' 4 ' On the other hand, in reopening the proceeding in Southern Louisiana II, the Commission
284 U.S.
(1932).
136. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, CCH UnL. L. RP.
11224,
at 12801 (FPC 1971).
284
at 389.
138. 307 U.S. 478 (1939).
139. CCH UTm.L.
11224, at 12801, discussing 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970).
The
rather gratuitously announced that "[a]s far as we are concerned, in the
prescription of just and reasonable rates, Opinion Nos. 546 and 546A [Southern
Louisiana 11 now perform no office." Id. But their existence was at least the procedural basis for distinguishing the Arizona Grocery rule.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1970).
141. 24 F.P.C. 1121, 1123 (1961).
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promulgated an "order instituting investigation and proposed rulemaking."' 4 2 The new proceedings were then consolidated with the
143
1961 proceedings.
A first articulation of this new rulemaking approach of the
FPC is found in the Appalachian and Illinois Basin area proceedings. 44 There were no prior NGA § 5 proceedings underway in
Appalachian and Illinois. The entire proceeding was initiated by
publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking (and the proposed
rule contemplated) under APA § 4,145 and a comprehensive report
by the FPC staff consisting of a cost analysis of the model used in
Permian and Southern Louisiana was attached thereto. 14 6 The procedure was attacked on the ground that it deprived parties of the
full adjudicatory hearing to which NGA §§ 4 and 5 were said to
entitle them. The FPC responded by noting that its power so to
proceed had been clearly established in such cases as Federal Power
Commission v. Texaco, Inc.,14 7 and United Gas Improvement Co. v.
Callery Properties, Inc.,148 where it had determined a standard requiring "in-line" price by using rulemaking procedure. The Commission might have relied upon the fact that such certification under
NGA § 7 constituted initial licensing and thus was partially exempt
from APA § 5149 along with ratemaking. Without making this
point, however, the FPC stated that procedings under NGA §§ 4
and 5 prescribe rates for the future, a function clearly exempted from
adjudication under APA §§ 2(c), 2(d) and 5(c). 150 In light of
this exemption of ratemaking from the adjudicatory requirements of
the APA, the FPC reasoned that only the hearing requirements
of APA § 4(b),' 5 ' providing that "when rules are required by statute
to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,
sections 556 and 557 [§ § 7 and 8] of this title apply . . . " would
be applicable.'5 2 Since §§ 7 and 8 merely insure that a qualified
142.
143.
144.
Rocky
1971).

CCH UTL. L. REP. 11224, at 12800.
Id.
86 P.U.R.3d 16 (FPC 1970). The new procedure was also utilized in
Mountain Area Rate Cases, CCH UTm. L. REP.
11222, at 12781 (FPC

145. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

86 P.U.R.3d at 21.
377 U.S. 33, 39-45 (1964).
382 U.S. 223, 227-29 (1965).
5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
Id. §§ 551(4), (6)-(7), 554(d).
Id. § 553(c).
86 P.U.R.3d at 20-21.
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examiner will sit on the matter and that an opportunity will be provided for exceptions to be taken to any proposed findings prepared
by the staff or examining officers, and since these requirements had
been satisfied, the FPC reasoned that there was no need for a full
hearing with presentation of witnesses and cross-examination, unless
there were substantial factual controversies.

Finding none, it ruled

that arriving at a proper rate order "without a full blown evidentiary
hearing" was appropriate.153 Presumably, in light of the exemption
of ratemaking from adjudication in the APA, and in the absence

of a provision in the NGA requiring that rates be fixed on the
basis of a full adjudicatory hearing, the only restraint on the FPC
would be the requirements of constitutional due process. In the
absence of substantial factual controversies, submission of the staff
report to interested parties with an invitation for comments thereon
would seem to satisfy due process requirements. In any event the
FPC so proceeded, concluding that "we believe the procedure we

are following in this case is consistent with statutory and constitutional
hearing requirements."' 15 4
153. Id. Sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-d (1970),
specify merely that "hearings" shall be held. See also Natural Gas Act § 15,
15 U.S.C. § 717n (1970).
154. 86 P.U.R.3d at 23. The Commission has been sustained in its use of
rulemaking procedure. City of Chicago v. F.P.C., 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
However, in Chicago the issue was not area prices but rather "the most appropriate
pricing method to be applied to natural gas utilized in a pipeline's interstate system which is produced by the pipeline or its affiliated producing company from
leases acquired after the date of determination of this issue." Id. at 737. "Evidentiary" hearings were held, but in reaching its decision the Commission relied
upon extra-record data bearing on gas reserves, a procedure valid in rulemaking.
The Commission was sustained by the court of appeals after "some inquiry into the
factual predicate for the rules promulgated by the Commission ....

"

Id. at 743.

The court stated that while its inquiry into the "factual predicate" was to be
"searching and careful," it would not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. It thus refused to limit itself merely to the question of whether the rules
promulgated bore some rational relationship to the regulatory objectives of the NGA
but nonetheless kept within the allowable confines of the "rational basis rule" as
enunciated in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
While the Chicago proceeding was more limited in scope than would be the
promulgation of an area price by rulemaking procedures, the Commission was nonetheless required to reconsider the underlying methodology used in the Permian
model and to determine the appropriateness of its application to a pipeline producer
as distinguished from an independent producer. As a consequence, Chicago can be
said to approve the procedure in circumstances where the formal rule promulgated
is underlaid by ad hoe rules normally arrived at in adjudication. The Chicago
court presumably avoided constitutional due process attack by noting that "[i]f the
pipeline is able to show in a rate proceeding that special circumstances exist which
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In Appalachian and Illinois the FPC formally promulgated only
the area rates as rules. With respect to the many alternative procedures for arriving at costs between which choices had been made
in Permian to arrive at the final rates, the FPC said only that "the
proposed rates are based on a cost analysis of the type used in Permian and Southern Louisiana for flowing gas." 155 It did not promulgate the Permianmethodology as formal rules.
The sequence of events was somewhat different in Southern
Louisiana, but the Commission nonetheless incorporated the new
rulemaking approach. Thus, the original Southern Louisiana I decision issued on October 1, 1968, was followed by an order proposing new rulemaking proceedings for Southern Louisiana which was
subsequently amended to provide for reopening the October 1, 1968
order as well.' 5 6 The amendment followed the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirming the October 1, 1968 order on the understanding that the FPC would reexamine its effects
on supply and demand. 1 57 As noted, the court had indicated specifically that the FPC should explain the relationship between the
level of service, the demand for service, and the price fixed, concluding that non-cost factors might be used to influence market
variables such as supply and demand and to create price stability,
but only if they were clearly identified and explained. 58
In this sequence of events moving toward greater use of rulemaking procedure, the Texas Gulf Coast area rate order, 59 issued
prior to the Southern Louisiana 1I order, became the vehicle for reexamination and rearticulation of the Permian approach to area ratemaking. In Texas Gulf Coast, an examiner's opinion and order had
been prepared after a full adjudicatory hearing, but at the time
Southern Louisiana I was reopened, a final decision had not yet
been issued. In order to synchronize with the Southern Louisiana
II orders both as a matter of administrative convenience and in order to assure that producers in similar circumstances, except for difjustify different treatment such a showing should be made by means of a special
schedule and supporting evidence filed in addition to the material otherwise required by [the regulations]." 458 F.2d at 758.
155. 86 P.U.R.3d at 18.
156. CCH Unm. L. REP. 11224, at 12800.
157. 428 F.2d at 444-45. See notes 119-22, 129-32 supra and accompanying
text.
158. 428 F.2d at 441.
159. Area Rate Proceeding for Texas Gulf Coast Area, 89 P.U.R.3d 1 (FPC
1971).
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ferences in areas, would receive similar treatment, the date of October 1, 1968 was selected as the nunc pro tunc effective date for
Texas Gulf Coast. There was no reliance upon rulemaking procedures except insofar as the final rates ultimately determined were
promulgated as rules.
In Southern Louisiana I, against a background of full adjudicatory proceedings, the producers' offer of settlement, in keeping with
APA § 5 (b),160 had been rejected by the FPC "at most as an additional pleading, albeit one to which many of the conflicting interests would subscribe ...

.""I'

The court of appeals reviewing

Southern Louisiana I, however, had viewed the settlement agreement favorably, concluding that it presented incentive plans important to the attainment on an industry-wide basis of specified reserve
dedication goals.1 62 In their offer of settlement the producers had
proposed achieving such goals by increased prices and by ad hoe
rules for the ratable forgiveness of refunds as new gas reserves were
committed to the jurisdictional market.'08 While no offer of settlement was before the FPC in Texas Gulf Coast, it had in hand the
offer for Southern Louisiana and, with the admonitions of the court
of appeals in mind, was persuaded to rely upon the offer for guidance. Against this background, the FPC proposed to review the
cost components for new gas, not with a view to departing from the
Permian methodology, but "to give more attention to the range
[of pricing results] which that methodology permits."'10 4 In the
main, the "range" was to be broadened by examining data open to
the "official notice" of the agency.' 65 However, the Commission
also proposed to examine "divergent methods of computation and
varying selection of statistics" implicit in the Permian methodology. 16 It did not propose to distinguish between cost and non-cost
elements to the full extent that it might have been authorized and
urged by the court of appeals in Southern Louisiana I, nor did it
propose to make the precise supply and demand findings which that
court had suggested be made. Instead, the Commission proposed to
adopt an approach which would quantify non-cost elements of cost
160. 5U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (1970).
161. 79 P.U.R.3d at 206-07.
162. 428 F.2d at 434.
163. See the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Carver, Area Rate Proceeding
for Southern Louisiana, 80 P.U.R.3d 197, 241-43 (1969).
164. 89 P.U.R.3d at 16.
165. Id. at 17.
166. Id. at 29.
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as far as possible and thus embrace them within the cost concept. 1 6 7
It proposed to search for a "surrogate for cost"' 6 where precise
costs were unascertainable and to make its selection of methods and
data on the "high side" in order to improve the cash flow of producers and enhance the expenditures for exploration. 1 69 Thus the
FPC reexamined the ad hoc rules prescribed as "methodology" in
Permian and reexamined the selection of data and the effect of using
later data in the application of the ad hoc rules of the methodology.
This reexamination generally "revealed" to the FPC a much
broader zone of reasonableness within which the "judgmental process" could operate than was apparent from the original Permian
and Southern Louisiana I opinions. 17' 0 The Commission concluded
that a credible, "high-side," range was from about 22 to about 26
cents per Mcf and within that range it fixed by rule 24 cents per Mcf
167. Id. at 10, 28.

To explain why better proof was not made as to the re-

sponsiveness of supply to price, the FPC said ".

.

. a useful econometric model

was impossible of construction given the number of variables and the time lag
factors for this complex business." Id. at 28.
168. Id. at 18.
169. Id. at 29. One might have supposed that the FPC would have seized on
the previous omission of a provision for a unit of income tax costs as an opportunity
to improve the Permian methodology. In the Permian case producers had argued
for the inclusion of 48 percent of the allowed return as an appropriate part of
the unit cost per Mcf; the FPC had disallowed the inclusion in the model on the
ground that "there will be no Federal income tax liability at any return up to 15
percent." 34 F.P.C. at 206, 388. This proposition is no doubt true since the options of percentage depletion and expensing intangibles are normally relied upon to
eliminate tax liability. However, these tax concessions are deliberately made by
Congress for the purpose of encouraging exploration, and not to allow provision in
the rate for the tax thus saved is to defeat the purpose of the congressional subsidy-it can hardly be a subsidy if the producers are not permitted to collect it
from their vendees. It is thus no answer to say that a tax allowance should not be
included in the rate provision because there is no liability-the object of the special
tax treatment is to relieve funds in the producers' hands from liability after they
have been collected, thus making monies available for further exploration. If the
FPC was making its selection of "methods and data" on the "high side" in order to
improve cash flow and enhance expenditures for exploration, inclusion of a mythical tax factor would seem to have had the congressional blessing. Of course, the
allowance for depletion was recently reduced by Congress when the hue and cry for
more exploration had already begun, but that may have been only in keeping with
the "political realities" of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (codified in scattered sections of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954). The Senate Committee, in
proposing reduction of percentage depletion, said that the "rate provided for oil and
gas wells is higher at the present time [1969] than is needed to achieve the desired
increase in reserves." S. RP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 179 (1969). The climate had changed substantially by 1971 when the Southern Louisiana II order was
handed down.
170. 89 P.U.R.3d at 12-13.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1973:41

as the just and reasonable rate for new gas. This rate, the FPC
said, represented its judgment as to the level necessary to elicit additional supplies from the area.171 The Commission noted its more
liberal approach: 'Were we have a range of creditable choices
within our costing model, we have exercised our judgment by making selections within the range on a cumulatively higher basis."'1 2
The effect of selections of data from the "high-side" and, by official
notice, from later data dehors the record, 13' may be seen in the
tabular presentation of the cost model for Texas Gulf Coast.17 4
171. Id. at 30. The Commission, in further observing that their rate determination took into account the relationship of other pricing areas, stated:
[Un setting rates for the future, we cannot limit our consideration to one
area, and ignore the nation-wide situation. We find that 24 cents is
consistent with nationwide costs of new gas, and calculated to permit
the interstate market to make some inroads into the trend of gas sales
to seek the intrastate market in the Texas Gulf and other competitive
market areas, nationwide. Id.
172. Id. at 29.
173. Id. at 17. The FPC said". . we have a wealth of postrecord data open
to our notice. We will refer to the data base as so broadened for the computations
in the sections following, because the purpose of that discussion is not to fix new
costs on the line-by-line basis, but rather to show the breadth of the range of
choices open to us." Id. Since the choice to be made was ultimately a rate expressed as a rule, such use of official notice was deemed justified. However, the
postrecord data were also adjudicative facts to which ad hoc rules were being
applied and which constitutional due process would dictate adducing on the record
if the data were subject to controversion; "solicitation of comments" thereon would
not necessarily be adequate. See K. DAvis, ADMiNISTRATrvE LAW TREATiSE § 15.00,
at 508 (Supp. 1970). The post-record data were not used merely "to verify" record
data and were certainly "matters of substance" within the meaning of due process.
See Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 561-62 (1945).

174.

COST OF NEW GAs-WELL GAS
IN CENTS PER MCF

Cost Elements
Depletion, Depreciation and Amortization
of Production Investment Costs:
Successful Well Costs
Lease Acquisition
Other Production Facilities
Exploration and Development Costs:
Dry Holes
Other Exploration Costs
Adjustment for Exploration in Excess
of Production
Production Operating Expense
Return on Production Investment
Return on Working Capital
Net Liquid Credit
Regulatory Expense
Subtotal
Royalty [at 14 percent of total]
Production Tax [at 6 percent]
Total
See 89 P.U.R.3d at 29.

Examiner's
Conclusion

Commission
Range

2.77
1.13
.34

2.70-4.10
1.13-2.03
.33-.73

1.44
1.70

1.64-1.97
1.29-2.18

1.16
2.70
4.90
.35
(3.50)
.14
13.13
2.30
.99
16.42

3.11
6.24-10.29
.47-.72
(4.10)-(4.41)
.14
12.95-20.86
2.27-3.65
.97-1.57
16.19-26.08

-
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The cost of flowing gas was not similarly reexamined but was
increased to 15 cents per Mcf "[i]n order to assure that inaccuracy
shall not result in the producers receiving less than their cost, including a proper rate of return . .
,17' Fixed future escalation
gasy6
flowing
and
new
both
for
made
provisions were
The FPC also concluded that unless modification was made
in the refund obligations of producers, new funds provided might be
diminished in discharging such obligations. In light of this possibility, it provided by rule that refund obligations could be reduced
by credits for each Mcf of new gas reserves committed by the producer to jurisdictional sales.17 7 Rate escalation rules, providing a
pattern for increase in contract rates in effect prior to October 1,
1968, were also approved and made contingent upon the dedication
of additional amounts of gas to interstate commerce. Commitments
of new gas were, however, required to be applied first to the satisfaction of outstanding refund obligations and only thereafter as a
basis for an escalation in price. All of these provisions were deemed
necessary to attract new entrants to natural gas production in the
17 8
area.
After the decision in Texas Gulf Coast the Southern Louisiana
However, there were important procedural differences between the two proceedings. In
Southern Louisiana II a final order had been issued by the FPC and
affirmed by a court of appeals, albeit with the abortive admonition
to reexamine the order in relation to supply and demand; a new investigation into area rates, coupled with an order for proposed rulemaking therein, had been issued and designated as Southern Louisiana II; finally, the FPC had before it an offer of settlement from
producers which it was prepared to accept, as distinguished from
Texas Gulf Coast where the Commission merely utilized the offer as
180
a guideline.

11 decision1 79 was almost anti-climactic.

The FPC made short shrift of arguments on behalf of public
175. Id. at 31-32.
176. Id. at 41-42.
177. Id. at 34.
178. Id. at 34-36.
179. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, CCII UTi.
(FPC 1971).
180. Id. 11224, at 12801-03.

L. REP.

11224
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bodies that it was without power to reopen and retroactively change
a legislatively determined rate. It relied wholly upon the interpretation of its authority by the court of appeals which had specifically
made the power to reopen any part of the Southern Louisiana I
order an integral part of the remedy of the court. 181 However, the
Commission cautiously consolidated the Southern Louisiana I proceedings and order with the later proceedings, reopening the earlier
proceedings presumably on a theory of mistake or new evidence.
It was thus not merely changing an earlier determined rate in a new
later proceeding and could be deemed in compliance with the Arizona Grocery and Baldwin cases.' 2 New orders were made effective from October 1, 1968, the date of the original order. The order providing notice of proposed rulemaking did not take the same
form as in the Appalachian and Illinois proceeding since this proceeding did not purport to be wholly a rulemaking proceeding; coupled with the notice of proposed rulemaking was an order reinstituting investigation into the justness and reasonableness of natural gas
rates in the Southern Louisiana area.' 83 As in the case of Appalachian and Illinois,'8 4 however, ultimate results were cast as formal
rules only as to the rates themselves.
Reexamination of the Permian model methodology and official
notice of later data were largely a replay of what had been done in
Texas Gulf Coast. As a result a price of 26 cents per Mcf was finally
promulgated as a rule and termed "the just and reasonable rate
subject to [specified] automatic escalation."' 88 Reductions in refund
obligations were promulgated as rules in the pattern of Texas Gulf
Coast with the same justifications given for adopting the proce86
dure.'
CONCLUSIONS
What of the next round, presumably Southern Louisiana III or
181. Id. 11224, at 12800-01.
182. See notes 135-39 supra and accompanying text.
183. CCH UTn. L. REP. 11224, at 12800.

184. 86 P.U.R.3d 16 (FPC 1970).
185. CCII UTm. L. REP. 1 11224, at 12809. The need for the increase was
challenged by the American Public Gas Association, and there were abortive attempts to impeach the declining reserve figures on which the FPC relied to sustain
the increase. Id. 1 11224, 12805-06. For an industry response, see Johnson, New
Directions in the Regulation of the Gas Industry, in 19TH ANN. INST. ON MINERAL

LAw (1972).
186. CCH UTIL. L. REP. 1 11224, at 12811-12.
panying text.

See note 177 supra and accom-
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even a nationwide proceeding? In Appalachian and Illinois, the
FPC said:
We recognize that as an administrative agency, governed by
congressional mandate, we cannot take any action to raise or lower
the price of gas-or take any other action relating to regulationwithout affording due process to those affected, and without satisfying ourselves on all available evidence that the public interest,
including the consumer interest in an adequate supply of natural gas,
is protected ....
On the other hand . . . [iln application, the effect of commission action under [NGA] §§ 4 and 5 is prospective-the former
from the time of filing for an increase, . . . the latter from the time
of issuance of a final order therein. These proceedings are classified
as rule makings under the APA . . . and the procedure we followed
satisfies [that act]. Thus, these proceedings are valid since interested persons had "an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation. . . ." Here interested parties were also given an opportunity to make an oral presentation at a
conference . . . . A record was made of all evidence which was
considered by us . . . . Thus, we find that the procedure followed
in this case adequately satisfied both . . . the Natural Gas Act
187
. . . . and . . . the APA.
It seems at least highly unlikely that, having rediscovered and
adapted these APA "rulemaking" provisions, the FPC will not continue to use them in avoidance of the "full-blown" evidentiary hearing it once thought was imposed upon it by NGA §§ 4 and 5.188
The new procedures and determinations resulting therefrom
have yet to be fully tested in the courts.'8 9 It is not untimely, there187. 86 P.U.R.3d at 19-21 (emphasis added).
188. Under a policy recently announced, the FPC now proposes "to examine
the justness and reasonableness of proposed rates in section 7 proceedings instituted under this section, thus avoiding the uncertainty of reserving rate determinations for subsequent section 4 or section 5 action." 37 Fed. Reg. 16192 (1972).
"Contracts approved unconditionally pursuant to the alternative procedure will be
free from any later attempt to impose a refund obligation." Id. at 16193. See also
id. at 18721, 20114. Thus, ad hoc interpretive ratemaking criteria may now be
formulated in a rulemaking procedure which is not even addressed to ratemaking
as such but to certification under § 7. The process may thereby be further removed from the ability of public interest bodies to scrutinize, since certification proceedings will be as frequent as there are new transactions to certify as compared
with the relative infrequency of an area price proceeding.
189. Since this article was set in type, the decision in Rocky Mountain Area Rate
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fore, to consider the legislative history underlying the APA exemption
of rulemaking from full adjudicatory requirements, and it is also pertinent to reexamine the reasons for including ratemaking in the rulemaking process rather than in the adjudicatory process.
As noted earlier, it seems reasonably clear that a major objecfive of the APA draftsmen in including ratemaking in rulemaking
was exemption from the full separation of functions requirements
which the APA imposed upon adjudication. 190 Commentaries at
the time of the adoption of the APA indicate that the ratemaking
processes were deemed so complex and so rife with policy determinations that they should not be left to the initial determination of a
single examiner as would be the case in adjudication proper. By
the exemption of ratemaking from the adjudication provisions the
way would be open to initial preparation of proposed findings by the
staff with full opportunity to draw upon all of the expert resources
of the agency.' 91 The same importance was not accorded the
greater control over the nature of the hearing which the rulemaking
processes vested in an agency because the agency was not required
to accord full participation by parties but only an opportunity to be
heard to interested persons.
There is the suggestion in the legislative history, however, that
when exempted proceedings become accusatory in form or involve
sharply controverted issues, the exemption should not apply and adjudicatory requirements should be met by the agency. 192 The General Counsel for the FPC in 1946 argued that such an interpretation
was contrary to the plain meaning of the APA, since all types of
ratemaking, including the retrospective finding of an unreasonable
rate as well as a rate reasonable for the future, were placed within
the rulemaking procedures. 19 3 But the Solicitor for the SEC noted
Cases, CCH UTm. L. REP.1 11222 (FPC 1971), which incorporated the procedure,
has been upheld by the Tenth Circuit. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, CCH UTIL.
L. REP. 11386 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1973). For a discussion of the case, see note
231 infra. One commentator has noted that if the rulemaking approach survives
challenge, "a nation-wide proceeding to . . . review gas producer's rates . . . will
probably be a rulemaking case with no hearing. . . ." Johnson, supra note 185.

190. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
191. See S. Doc. No. 248, supranote 6, at 203-04, 209-10.
192. Id. See Foster, supra note 16, at 243, quoting Comments from SEC to
Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, July 25, 1945.
193. Ross, FederalPower Commission Practiceand Procedure as Affected by the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, in THE FEDERAL AD MisaTivE PRocEDURE
Acr AND THE ADMmISTRATrE AGENCIES 170, 178-79 (G. Warren ed. 1947).
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that the effect of the exemption was only to provide for what might
be called a "functional" approach by the agencies-that is, to avoid
by exemption from adjudication, controversies as to how particular
procedures should be labeled under the terminology of the APA and
thereby to focus attention on what procedural steps the parties considered appropriate. Thus, the Solicitor indicated that the rules of
practice of the Securities and Exchange Commission made it the
duty of the parties to specify as early as possible in the proceeding
what procedures they deemed necessary or appropriate; the examiner
was then charged with reaching a clear understanding as to the procedure which the parties desired.'"" The Solicitor further noted,
however, "[o]f course the Administrative Procedure Act would not
deprive public security holders of any procedural rights to which they
might be entitled as a matter of due process or otherwise, apart from
the requirements of the Act."'19 5
Since there is no retroactive reparations power vested in the
FPC except for rates in excess of approved schedules,' 96 whether or
not retroactive ratemaking is wholly or only partially exempt from
the adjudicatory requirements of the APA is not of immediate concern. However, a plausible analysis of the APA can be made which
would leave retroactive ratemaking within adjudication with regard
to party participation and exempt it only from the adjudicatory safeguards requiring separation of functions. This result would follow
from the fact that past and prospective ratemaking is exempted in
the APA from § 5(c),' 97 the requirements on separation of functions in adjudication, but only prospective ratemaking is included in
rulemaking as defined in APA § 2(c). 198 Thus past ad hoc interpretive rulemaking in ratemaking would require full adjudicative
party participation in both the formulation and application of rules
promulgated therein. 9 9 And since NGA §§ 4 and 5 require a
200
hearing incident to fixing just and reasonable rates, APA § 4(a)
should not operate to exempt interpretive or ad hoc rulemaking in
194. Foster, supra note 16, at 221-22.
195. Id. at 242.
196. See Natural Gas Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970).
197. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2) (B) (1970). See also Administrative Procedure Act
§ 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970): "'Rlule' means the whole or a part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability of future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. . ....
198. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
199. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(b), 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1970).
200. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1970).
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connection therewith from the notice and participation requirements of APA § 4,201 as would be the case if there were no such

NGA requirement.
Assuming that formulation of ratemaking criteria such as the
Permian methodology can now be carried on as rulemaking in accordance with APA § 4(a) and (b),202 what degree of participation is assured to parties in the adjudicative fact-finding process incident to applying the interpretive methodology or ad hoc rules?
Since the APA assures no more than rulemaking participation with
respect to all prospective ratemaking, there could be substantial factual controversies in rules application where the parties need not,
under the APA, be afforded an opportunity to offer rebutting testimony through witnesses or to cross-examine witnesses submitting
either documentary or oral evidence. However, if such opportunities are denied in reliance upon the APA, parties could plausibly
fall back upon constitutional procedural due process 208 as guaranteeing such greater participation even though not provided by the
APA. Congress can maximize the agency's utilization of expert resources and facilitate the agency's conservation of money and personnel by relegating the actual rulemaking aspects of ratemaking to
the lesser protection of limited participation provided in APA rulemaking; where there are truly substantial controversies over adjudicative facts, however, the Constitution would seem to require a
"full-blown" evidentiary hearing.2 °4
The Texas Gulf Coast and Southern Louisiana area rate proceedings were both initiated under NGA §§ 4 and 5 and conducted as full evidentiary hearings with presentation of witnesses
and cross-examination, all in full compliance with § 5205 of the
APA. As a consequence, the ad hoc formulations of Permian
methodology for area rates were made in a full adjudicatory context
with opportunity for parties and intervenors to take exception to
such formulations and to propose counter-formulations or rules.
201. An exemption for interpretive or ad hoc rules is provided only from the
requirement of publication before effectiveness by virtue of APA § 4(c), 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(d)(2) (1970), which makes such publication inapplicable to "interpretive
rules and statements of policy."
202. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c)(1970).
203. See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
204. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comn'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937);
United States v. Abilene &S. Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924).
205. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
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However, in the Appalachian and Illinois proceedings, it will be recalled, the entire procedure was based on the exception of ratemaking from the adjudicatory provisions of the APA and was entirely
conducted as proposed rulemaking pursuant to § 4206 of the APA.
A copy of the FPC staff's comprehensive report was attached to the
notice, the notice stating that the staff recommendations largely reflected standards and principles approved by the courts in the Permian rate decision. The FPC solicited comments thereon by interested persons and stated that it would make appropriate revisions;
it indicated, however, that since many of the usual area rate controversies would not be in issue, it saw no need for the lengthy full
hearing approach.20 7 In other words, in lieu of the full adversary
setting of Permian in which representatives of state public service
commissions and consumer groups were given status as intervening
parties with full opportunity to cross-examine producers' witnesses
as to methodology and in which producers' counsel were given the
same opportunities with respect to staff and public distributors' witnesses, the FPC proposed to proceed and did proceed on the basis
of "comments of all interested parties, supplemented by conferences
and such limited hearings as might be requested and deemed by it
to be necessary."208
The new rulemaking approach to ratemaking matters thus
raises serious questions as to whether the public interest will be adequately protected therein.20 9 It poses the danger that "settlement
proposals" by producing interests may not be subjected to the same
scrutiny as they would under the full adversary adjudicatory process.
The setting may be one in which the FPC may unduly indulge its
206. Id. § 553.
207. 86 P.U.R.3d at 19-23.
208. Id. at 21.
209. The need for "streamlining" procedure because of the number of parties
involved would be considerably diminished if regulation were confined to the 70
producers of 90 percent of the gas, thus very substantially reducing the administrative burden. In that event, of course, the case for full adjudicatory procedures
would also be more formidable, since public hearings with full intervention by public service commissions and other consumer bodies would be a crucial weapon in
safeguarding the public interest in the consideration of methodology and selection
of data. The limited number of participants might also underscore the need for
scrutiny of the state of industry concentration under the antitrust laws. See Diener,
Area Price Regulation in the Natural Gas Industry of Southern Louisiana, 46
TULANE L. Rnv. 695, 721-23 (1972).
But see Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 41 U.S.L.W.
2332 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 2, 1973), for the judicial view that such "deregulation" of small
producers, though imaginative, outruns FPC statutory powers.
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preoccupation with "industry consequences" such as the "worsening gap between supply and demand" and with the proposition that
"price must have a major responsibility for eliciting new supplies,"'2 1 to the detriment of the public interest in the elimination of
monopoly profit and conservation of a scarce resource.
The primary reason for the inclusion of ratemaking in rulemaking and the exclusion of rulemaking from hdjudicatory requirements
in §§ 5(c) and 8(a) 211 of the APA was to free the agencies from
the single examiner decisional technique and thus to make possible a
decisional pattern permitting the ful expertise of the agency to be
brought to bear in the formulation of policy rules and procedures
where complex ratemaking and other financial issues were involved. 12 The exemptions were also a recognition of the legislative
character of ratemaking and the formulation of rules for the determination of rates, particularly for the future.213 Only when a substantive regulatory statute itself provided opportunity for an agency
hearing, and rules were to be made upon the record therein, was
there to be a limited application of the adjudicatory proceduresthat is, provision for a qualified examiner to preside at the hearing
and to participate in the decision with agency discretion to substitute for an examiner's report a recommended decision by the staff.
Even with the staff participation in the rulemaking decision, however, there was clear recognition in APA § 8(b)2 1 4 of the constitutional requirements imposed by Morgan v. United States (Morgan
11)215 as to notice of the issues and opportunities to meet them fairly."

Thus, where the examiner report procedure was to be departed from
and a recommended decision submitted by a "responsible employee," § 8(b) 21 7 required that adverse parties be afforded an opportunity to take exception to such recommended decision and to present opposing findings and conclusions. There did not appear to
be any legislative intent to remove the prosecuting staff from an
210. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, CCH UTm. L. REP.
11224,
at 12803 (FPC 1971).
211. 5 U.S.C.§§ 554(d), 557(b) (1970).
212. See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
213. See note 190-91 supra and accompanying text.
214. Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970).
215. 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
216. Id. at 18 ("[the right to a hearing embraces not only the right to
present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them").
217. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970).
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advocate's adversary position even though the initial recommended
decision might not be prepared under full separation-of-functions
conditions.
In the Permian proceedings, the FPC adhered to full adjudicatory procedures and a full adversary position for the staff with no
mention of "proposed rulemaking" in the initial notice and order
for investigation of rates. The examiner was fully qualified under
APA §§ 7 and 11218 and prepared an initial decision without participation by the staff.2 19 Except as agency expertise was reflected
in the staff exhibits and staff participation in the hearing, there was
no other utilization of agency expertise of a character to violate the
separation of functions requirements of the APA. In fact, in Permian the examiner called his own witness in order that he might
have the benefit of a relatively disinterested party's comments on the
various proposed models for area rates and for procedures thereunder. 220 The staff, producers and intervening parties all filed
briefs with the examiner preliminary to his decision. This procedure
was repeated when the examiner's report was submitted to the FPC
for review and issuance of a final decision. Throughout the proceedings the staff occupied a full adversary position vis-h-vis the producers, and no attempt was made to utilize the procedures available
under §§ 5(c) and 8(a) of the APA. 2
In its present utilization of the rulemaking procedures, as exemplified in the Appalachian and Illinois case, the FPC, of course,
evidences an intention to comply fully with the constitutional requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard set forth in Morgan 11222 and to accord an adjudicatory hearing in a conventional
public hearing arena wherever there are factual controversies.223
Absent pressure for such an adjudicatory hearing, however, the
staff's role is one of submitting written analyses of data submitted by
producers pursuant to questionnaires, with the Permian model and
methodology to be applied thereto.
The results of the examiner's deliberations in Permianwere embodied in an examiner's initial decision which was served on the
218. Id. H 556, 3105.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

34 F.P.C. at 172.
Id. at 308.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d), 557(b) (1970).
See notes 214-17 supra and accompanying text
34 F.P.C. at 238.
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The ad hoe methodology

(interpretive rules) adopted by the examiner was subjected to

searching criticism, with the relative merits of ad hoe methods
adopted by the examiner compared with the alternatively proposed
rules of the opposing parties.22 4 Under the new procedure there
need be no such full airing of ad hoe methodology. Proposals for
changes in the Permian model and the data utilized will be contained in an FPC staff report and served on the producers and other

interested parties. However, there will be no routine public hearings in which the staff proposals and the responses and criticisms
will be subject to the public spotlight: "[T]he staff's recommendations will be considered in light of any comments submitted by interested persons, and . . . [the FPC] would make appropriate
revisions.

225

While this procedure satisfies the Morgan II requirement embodied in APA § 8 (b) 2 2 6 that adequate notice of the proposed ad
hoc procedures be served on the affected parties, since the report of
the FPC staff is the equivalent of the examiner's initial decision in
this respect, the public hearing drops out and is supplanted by com-

ments on the staff report to be "considered" by the FPC with the
possibility such comments may elicit revisions. 227edeThis procedure
224. 86 P.U.R.3d at 21.
225. Id. In some respects the FPC approach stops short of what has been
done by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and in some respects it
moves beyond the FCC. The FCC has attempted to move the staff into the decisional process by limiting its role in the hearings to the development of a full and
complete record and by forbidding the staff from taking a conventional adversary
position. However, the FCC adheres to full public evidentiary hearings with the
omission of full adversary participation therein by the staff. On this basis the FCC
justifies drawing the staff into the decisional process. See American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 2 F.C.C.2d 142, 146 (1965). On the other hand, the FPC staff is apparently
not precluded from vigorous advocacy in reporting on the application of the Permian
cost model to data submitted by producers and others, but full evidentiary hearings
will not be had unless there are "substantial factual controversies." Appalachian
and Illinois Area Proceeding, 86 P.U.R.3d 16, 21 (FPC 1970). Both the FCC and
FPC eliminate the examiner's role. It has been suggested that the FCC errs in
limiting the staff's role as advocate, K. DAvis, supra note 173, § 13.00, at 449-57
(Supp. 1970), and that, without resorting to such limitation, it could still utilize the
staff in the decisional process if staff and other ex parte views were available for
exception in a recommended decision, with no participation thereafter. This procedure would also meet the criticism of FCC Commissioner Loevinger that FCC
procedure permits one party, the staff, access to ex parte advocacy while denying it
to other parties, particularly the utility. 2 F.C.C.2d at 163 (Loevinger, C. dissenting).
226. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970).
227. The recommendations of the Administrative Conference, S. Doc. No. 24,
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may pose great danger in removing the staff from the full advocateadversary role performed by it in a conventional public rate hearing.
While the letter of the Morgan II decision would appear to be
complied with, it is less clear that its spirit has been met. In Morgan
v. United States (Morgan 1)228 the Supreme Court said that "[a]
proceeding of this sort . . . has a quality resembling that of a judicial
proceeding." '
Part of the resemblance would certainly lie in the
routine public quality of a judicial proceeding with availability for
press and other media coverage. While in the present approach,
the producers are clearly accorded the "cherished judicial tradition
embodying the basic concepts of fair play" 230 set forth in Morgan
II, a question might well be raised whether the newly evolved procedures will assure completely fair play and full development of
methodology in the public interest by the FPC staff, as aided by the
public service commissions and consumer and conservation groups.
The weakness of the FPC's proceeding under formal rulemaking with the rate and accompanying terms and conditions as the
only formal rule promulgated, is that the procedure submerges and
devitalizes both the role of the interpretive ad hoc rulemaking process, as seen in the formulation of the Permian model and methodology, and the vital role of the adjudicative fact-finding process, as
seen in the selection of data to which the Permian model and methodology were to be applied. It seems doubtful that the APA draftsmen intended this result even though the literal words of the Act
23
seemingly permit it. 1
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 103-06 (1963), provide a possible solution in lieu of the experimentation now going on at the FCC and FPC. The Conference recommends preserving the traditional role of the examiner and public hearing but giving
the examiner greater access to expert assistance in the preparation of his initial decision, thus speeding up the process. In the greater flexibility provided by the
APA's classification of ratemaking as rulemaking, such expert assistance could even
come from the staff advocates so long as their views were identified and thus subject to exception. See K. DAvis, supra note 173, § 13.00, at 455-56 (Supp. 1970).
228. 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
229. Id. at 480.

230. 304 U.S. at 22.
231. See discussion beginning at note 3 supra and accompanying text.

As noted

earlier, the draft bill from which the idea of "ratemaking as rulemaking" was derived, S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 6, at 161, 166, provided for the formal publication of interpretive rules presumably with application to follow in adjudicative proceedings. It is also to be noted that in commenting upon the incorporation of ratemaking as rulemaking, a spokesman cautioned that "[tihere are . . . some instances
. . . which tend to be accusatory in form and involve sharply controverted factual
issues to which agencies should not apply the exceptions because they are not to be

88
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interpreted as precluding fair procedure where it is required." Id. at 203-04. The
comment might have been meant as a suggestion that adjudicative fact finding incident to application of interpretive rules formulated in a ratemaking proceeding would
require full evidentiary hearings at the agency level. But the compromise resulted
in a transfer of the entire ratemaking process from adjudication to rulemaking,
leaving untouched the exemption of interpretive rules from formal rulemaking procedures. If the draftsmen had intended to completely free interpretive rulemaking in
ratemaking from adjudicative processes, they might have provided a parenthetical exclusion of ratemaking in Administrative Procedure Act §§ 4(a), 4(c), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 553(b)(3)(A), (d)(1) (1970). Since the draftsmen did not do this, arguably
they intended as to interpretative rulemaking, even in ratemaking, "to leave the
matter of notice and public procedures to the discretion of the agencies concerned."
A commentator on the FPC utilization of its newly discovered rulemaking
powers has suggested that:
When the rule-making power of an agency depends on a general statutory authority to adopt rules and regulations, the crucial questions in each
instance of its application to issues that are also subject to adjudication
is whether the statute by implication requires these matters to be determined case by case and whether affected parties possess procedural rights
not accorded in the rule-making hearing . . . . Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781, 800 (1965).
Since this paper was set in type, the Tenth Circuit has upheld, in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. FPC, CCH Unim. L. REP. 11386 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1973), the authority
of the FPC to proceed by rulemaking procedures in fixing area rates. However, the
majority opinion strays far afield in sustaining the power of the FPC. The court
accepts the reasoning that, because the APA classifies ratemaking as rulemaking, to
achieve exemption from the separation of functions limitations of APA § 5(c), 5
U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970), the ratemaking function may be deemed a conventional
rule issued pursuant to NGA § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970), which merely defines
terms or prescribes the form and content of statements. This "bootstrap" operation
enables the court to conclude that the NGA vests a "very broad discretion" in the
FPC in determining the form of its proceedings. Thus, the FPC is seemingly sustained in its statement that
In a rulemaking proceeding, such as the instant one, our primary objective
is the acquisition of information which will enable us, inter alia, to determine just and reasonable rates . . . . The purpose is not to allow interested
parties to define the issues or narrow the scope of the proceedings. On
the contrary, in soliciting comments . .. and in relying upon the experience gained through previous area rate proceedings, we are building a
record from which we can make a determination of . . . producer
rates. .... CCH U-m.L. REP. 111386, at 13772 (emphasis added).
The majority of the court were unwilling to perceive that a ratemaking proceeding is
not just ordinary "rulemaking" but is the formulation of ad hoe rules which may
be vigorously opposed with respect to their content and operation, as well as in
their application to often conflicting facts. A strong dissent notes the possibility
of such disputed issues of fact which should be resolved in an evidentiary hearing.
The controversy will no doubt be resolved by the Supreme Court if the circuits
differ on the issue, or possibly, because of its importance, even if they do not. In
that forum, it is to be hoped that the hybrid status of ratemaking as ad hoc rulemaking and fact finding, and the legislative history which indicates that the rulemaking exception was intended primarily to allow staff participation in the decisional
process and not to limit the adversary process, will be more fully explored.

